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3Abstract
This study analyzes the Turkish case as a model country for the state-building processes in the
Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab revolts that took place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.
To this end, it deals with the Turkish case in three phases: the founding of the Turkish
Republic, political developments until 2002, and the post-2002 Justice and Development
Party period. The study focuses on state-society relations manifested in the form of a secular-
religious cleavage intertwined with problematic civil-military relations. Each phase of
Turkey’s history is compared to cleavages and civil-military relations in Egypt, Tunisia and
Libya. After analyzing the constitution-making processes in the latter three countries
following the Arab revolts, the study concludes by discussing the viability of the Turkish
model in the light of Turkey’s search for a new constitution.
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5MODEL
COUNTRIES IN
POLITICAL
ANALYSIS:
Is Turkey a Model
for State-Building
in the Arab
World?
by Aylin Güney1 and Hasret Dikici Bilgin2
Introduction
Since 11 September, 2001, the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region has
been in constant political turmoil and the
most recent Arab revolts have added to this
situation. The US wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, following the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, have been
accompanied by US rhetoric of democracy
promotion in the Arab world.3 Since then,
the removal of dictatorial regimes,
especially in the Arab world, which is
considered as the hotbed of terrorist
1 Yaşar University, Department of International
Relations, Izmir, Turkey. Email:
aylin.guney@yasar.edu.tr
2 Okan University, Department of International
Relations, Istanbul, Turkey. Email:
hasret.bilgin@okan.edu.tr
3 Carothers, T, (2007).
organizations, has constituted the core of
US national strategy. The Arab revolts in
Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, which were
marked by the removal of dictators Ben
Ali, Gaddafi and Mubarak respectively,
gave rise to state-building in the post-
revolution period, which has become an
issue of intense debate amongst academics
since state institutions have been regarded
as malfunctioning in these countries.
Turkey, as a regional actor, has been at
the epicenter of these developments. Being
a relatively stable country with a
functioning democracy, a secular state and
liberal market economy, it has been
presented as a ‘model’ country for the
state-building process in the post-
revolution periods in the Arab countries in
question. This debate about whether
Turkey can be a model for Arab countries
in transition to democratic regimes has
intensified as the topic has been widely
covered by the media and also referred to
by various political figures in the Arab
states, in Turkey and in the countries
outside the region, including the US.4
In this respect, this paper, in
assessing whether Turkey can be
4 Kaya Erdem, B., (2012).. p. 435. See also M.
Kirecci, M.A.( 2012). p. 112. Derviş,.K.(2013), Al-
Labbad M. (2012), Anderson L. (1986). Armağan,
T. Z. (2012) Bâli A. Ü. (2012), Cağaptay, S.
(2011), Çağaptay S. (2012). Kayadibi S and
Birekul M. (2011). Kayaoğlu,T., (2012).
6considered a model for Arab countries, will
highlight the most controversial aspect of
Turkish state-society relations, namely the
relationship between Islam and democracy.
Since civil-military relations are also
related to this topic, they will also be dealt
with as a complementary issue. They are
also deemed important because the military
has played a very important role in Turkish
political life since the founding of the
Republic. The paper presumes that the
analysis of constitution-making may
provide evidence as to whether the actors
in one country take another country’s
constitution as a model in certain aspects.
Thus, it will, at times, refer to the
constitutions of the Arab countries to
reveal differences and similarities with
Turkey’s. Finally, it will assess whether the
Turkish case can provide an example or
inspiration for Arab countries in transition.
Islam and Democracy in Turkey: the
Ottoman Legacy?
One of the most important and
controversial issues regarding Turkey is
how, with its approximately 99 percent
Muslim population, it could establish and
sustain a democratic regime, which,
despite some brief interruptions, has
managed to survive until now. In other
words, how have Islam and democracy
managed to co-exist in Turkish political
life?
To address this question, it is important
to shed further light upon the main ideas
and principles on which modern Turkey is
based. In order to be able to assess whether
Turkey can constitute a model country for
the Arab world, this study will first outline
the main characteristics of the Turkish
Republic. Since its foundation on 23
October 1923, following the demise of the
centuries-old Ottoman Empire, the Turkish
Republic has been characterized by several
important features. First, it aimed to create
a secular state as opposed to the Ottoman
Empire, with its first duty being to protect
the freedom of conscience of its citizens.
Second, it based the notion of citizenship
on constitutional citizenship, which
eventually recognized the non-Muslim
Jewish, Christian and Greek minorities as
the only minority groups. Third, from the
memory of foreign occupation and
subsequent War of Independence, it stood
by the principle of the indivisible integrity
of the Turkish Republic. Fourth, the
military was regarded as the ‘guardian’ of
the two main principles – secularism and
the unitary state – upon which the Turkish
Republic was founded.
It is important to note that Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern
Turkey, tried to pursue both nation-
building and state-building processes
inspired by French revolutionary ideas. As
7Ahmad argues, “in the tradition of
revolutionary France, the Kemalists saw
the Allied occupation of Istanbul in March
1920 not as a de facto end of the Ottoman
state but as the beginning of a new era by
what Kemal described as the ‘first national
year’.”5 The first step was to create a new
society. Just as the French Revolutionaries
had to create the Frenchman, the Kemalists
had to create a new type of ‘Turk’ different
from the ‘Ottoman’. 6
However, one can argue that Atatürk,
in a rather pragmatic fashion, followed a
two-step process in establishing a secular
state. First, when the first Turkish Grand
National Assembly convened in Ankara on
23 April 1920 in the middle of the War of
Independence, Atatürk made it clear that
the priority was only to end the occupation
of the country. Although he was well
aware of the fact that the Second Group in
the Parliament, i.e. the opposition, focused
basically on religious issues, he did not
“show his hand” until the end of the War
of Independence. It was only after victory
that it became easier for him to “assume a
hold over politics” and initiate the
reforms.7
The radical reforms aimed at
establishing a new state-religion-society
5 Ahmad, F. (1993), p.77.
6 Ibid.
7 Mardin, S. (1973) pp. 169-190, see p.181.
relationship came into force after the
declaration of the Republic on 29 October
1923, when the founders tried to distance
the new Republic from the Ottoman past
and the Islamic heritage that characterized
it. In particular, they recognized that if the
Caliphate and various other Islamic
institutions continued to exist, then
supporters of the Ottoman Empire would
be able to “manipulate the symbols of
Islam as powerful weapons against the
reformers and their program.”8 Therefore,
they took the radical steps of abolishing the
Caliphate in 1924 and closing autonomous
religious lodges (tekke ve zaviyeler) and
Sufi orders (tarikat). In addition, the
Directorate of Religious Affairs was
established in the same year “to act as the
ultimate authority on the knowledge and
practice of Islam. The directorate would
operate directly under the Office of the
Prime Minister and its chair and board
would be appointed by the president”, 9
while Islamic law (sharia) was replaced by
a new secular civil code modeled on
Switzerland’s. This code was revolutionary
in many ways: first, “it outlawed all forms
of polygamy, annulled religious marriages,
and granted equal rights to men and
women in matters of inheritance, marriage
and divorce. The religious court system
and institutions of religious education were
8 Ahmad, p. 54.
9 Çınar, A. (2005), p. 16.
8abolished. The use of religion for political
purposes was banned, the article that
defined the Turkish state as “Islamic” was
removed from the constitution, and the
alphabet was changed, replacing Arabic
letters with Roman ones”. 10 Chanting
prayers in Turkish instead of Arabic was
another revolutionary step. For Çınar,
“these steps represent the
institutionalization of secularism, which
involved not exclusion, but a tightly
controlled inclusion of Islam in the public
sphere.”11
Reconciling Islam with democracy
constituted the main challenge for the
founders of the Republic, who were
struggling to establish a state de novo.
Tachau argues that “the dawning of a new
political era was heralded by the adoption
of a new Constitution in January 1921,
consolidated and reenacted in 1924. The
most important aspect of this constitution
was its proclamation that “sovereignty
belongs unconditionally to the nation” and
that the Grand National Assembly was the
only true representative of the nation.”12
Despite all these revolutionary steps,
continued allegiance to Islamic values and
glorification of Ottoman times were major
factors encouraging suspicion towards the
10 Ibid.p.17.
11 Ibid. p. 17.
12 Tachau F., (1984), p. 37.
Kemalist Reforms. The dissolution of
political parties in the First Parliament,
such as the Progressive Republican Party
established in 1925 and the Free Party in
1930,13 indicated that Islamic conservatism
still constituted a challenge to
modernization reforms. Consequently,
Atatürk’s initial attempts to establish a
multi-party democracy proved to be
unsuccessful.
It is important to note that the basic
problem during the early Republican and
subsequent single-party years faced by the
Republican Peoples’ Party (RPP) was how
to establish a democratic regime by
“accelerating the process of literacy and
education in the new Turkey”.14 Although,
for Atatürk, the creation of a “democratic
citizen” was of utmost importance, low
literacy levels in Anatolia were considered
a major obstacle to this end. Therefore,
Atatürk recognized that an important
dimension of the state-building process
was to create the necessary institutions to
educate the people and elevate them to the
level of contemporary civilization. Thus,
since education of the masses was an
indispensable element of the new Republic,
the “script revolution” of moving from the
Arabic to the Roman alphabet became
necessary. 15 In 1937, “secularism was
13 Güney A. and Başkan, F. (2008), p.266.
14 Ahmad, 81.
15 Ibid., p. 82.
9included in the Constitution so that the
amended Article 2 read: “The Turkish
State is Republican, Nationalist, Populist,
Statist, Secularist, and Revolutionary-
Reformist.”16
Turning now to Arab countries,
disassociating themselves from their
Ottoman past was also central to the state-
building strategies of these states that had
emerged from the Ottoman Empire in the
Middle East. In their early years, these new
states, and their largely Ottoman Turkish-
speaking ruling elites, mainly continued
the former Ottoman Imperial
administrative system, while they based
their laws on the Ottoman code of law
known as Mecelle.17 However, centuries of
Ottoman domination and more recently
decades of Western colonial rule meant
that the Ottoman past was constructed as
an era of foreign invasion. Therefore, while
the Arab nationalism that emerged in the
20th century primarily targeted Western
colonial involvement, it also distanced
itself from the Ottoman rule, partly to
negate the old ruling elite. Prominent
leaders of the movement, such as Egypt’s
Gamal Abdel Nasser and Libya’s
Muammar Gaddafi, deployed anti-
imperialistic rhetoric as part of their Arab
16 Ibid., p. 63.
17 Yilmaz, S.and Yosmaoğlu, I. K., (2008). p. 679.
nationalist ideology that now shaped state
policies.
Arab nationalists, seeking to emphasize
commonalities among Arabs across the
Middle East and North Africa, also
confronted Ottoman social organization
based on confessional origins, known as
the millet system. This resentment towards
the founding elites of the major Arab states
because of their Ottoman past carries both
similarities and differences with that of
Turkey’s republicans. On the one hand,
both modern Arab and Turkish
nationalisms defined their nations by
distancing themselves from ‘the Ottoman’,
with educational and language reforms, for
example, being initiated accordingly. On
the other hand, while Arab nationalism
aimed to unify all Arabic people of the
region within one single state, Turkish
nationalism explicitly rejected
expansionism and revisionism, limiting
itself to the Anatolian Turks within the
limits of the National Act (Misak-ı Milli).
Both post-independence Arab and
Turkish state elites experienced a
conflicting attitude towards the West: one
of perceived cultural threat combined with
admiration of Western modernity. Both
Arabs and Turks had revolted against
Western domination in the aftermath of
World War One. The Turkish War of
Independence led to the establishment of
10
the Republic in 1923 as mentioned above,
while the Egyptian revolt against the
British mandate which had been
established on the eve of the Great War led
to independence in 1922, although British
influence continued until the Free Officers
Movement’s military takeover and the
inauguration of Nasser as President in the
1954.18
Libya remained under Italian mandate,
while French domination of Tunisia
continued until the mid-1950s. The Italian
defeat in World War Two allowed Libya to
attain independence under King Idris in
1951, before he was toppled in a coup
d’état by Gaddafi’s Free Unionist Officers
in 1969. The Tunisian struggle for
independence from French colonialism, led
by Habib Bourguiba, an activist journalist
and politician, led to the declaration of the
Republic in 1957. Thus, the de facto
independence of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia
were all owed to post-1945 anti-colonial
independence movements. Their colonial
experiences also transformed their
perceptions of the Ottoman past to one that
equated it with foreign rule and the
exploitation of the region’s natural
resources. In Turkey, by contrast, criticism
of the Ottoman past focused on its
traditionalism and backwardness.
18 For a more detailed account of the Egyptian
struggle for independence, see Gordon, J. (1992).
It is important to note that the military,
especially junior officers, played an
indispensable role in the anti-imperialist
struggle and the establishment of republics
in Turkey, Egypt and Libya. It was only in
Tunisia that civilians and political parties –
whose activities had been suppressed by
colonial rule – led to the establishment of
the modern state. The Egyptian and Libyan
military takeovers shared several
similarities, with the Libyan officers’
movement replicating the Egyptian model
of organization both before and after their
intervention.19 As well as similarities in the
institutional structures of the new one-
party militarist states in the two countries,
both Gaddafi and Nasser emphasized Arab
nationalism, socialism and anti-
imperialism as the main principles of
nation-building.20 This pioneering role of
the military in state and nation-building in
Egypt and Libya, and earlier in Turkey,
resulted in the military becoming
entrenched as part of the state elite. The
extent that this military-dominated state
elite permitted Islam to be visible in the
public sphere defined the nature of state-
society relations and intertwined the debate
on political Islam with that concerning
civil-military relations.
19 St John, R. B., (2008). p. 92.
20 Ibid.
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Political Islam, Democracy and the
Military
One can argue that throughout
Turkey’s republican history, trends in the
politicization of Islam can be traced from
the formation of either religiously-oriented
political parties (National Order Party,
National Salvation Party, Welfare Party,
Virtue Party etc.) or center-right parties
(Democrat Party, Justice Party etc.) that
refer to religious values. It is also worth
noting that the Islamic opposition in
Turkey did not resort to violence, but
allowed itself to become integrated into the
political system, thereby trying to avoid
clashes between the political elite and the
state elite. Heper argues that “the
consolidation of democracy in Turkey and
the gradual reincorporation of Islam into
politics were facilitated by the increasing
secularization of the Turks, after the
establishment of the Republic in 1923,
which made general support for a radical
religious revival less likely.”21
The state elite, comprised of the
Kemalist and secular military-bureaucratic
establishment,22 regarded the political elite,
perceived by the former as pursuing
populist, short-term and sometimes
religiously-oriented interests and policies,
21 Heper, M. (1997) p. 34.
22 Güney and Başkan, p. 263.
with suspicion. This perception of political
Islam by the Turkish state elite is rooted in
the traditionalist-Western divide during the
late Ottoman period. On March 31 1909, a
group of Islamists staged a
counterrevolution against the Young Turk
Revolution of 1908. Alleged British
support for reactionaries in 1909, and later
collaboration during the Independence
War, further centralized the anti-imperialist
movement around the Republicans. The
Republicans’ victory in 1923 delayed the
institutionalization of the Islamist
movement as a political party for nearly
half a century. Although Islamists,
especially the tariqats, found
representation within center-right parties,
they were unable to establish their own
party until the 1970s.
The Turkish state elite employed two
main ways of intervening to prevent the
rise of political Islam: first, the repeated
dissolution of religiously-oriented political
parties by the Constitutional Court; second,
the Turkish military’s direct and indirect
political interventions. In this respect, the
definition (as in the Internal Service Act,
Article 35) of threats in Turkey’s laws,
especially internal ones, is noteworthy.
These threats are defined as political Islam
and Kurdish separatism. The Turkish
military has long been depicted as a
12
‘political army’ 23 in the military studies
literature because it has intervened
politically to overthrow an elected
government three times (1960, 1971, and
1980) directly and once indirectly, which is
also referred to as the post-modern coup
(1997).
In Egypt, by contrast, continued British
influence despite independence in 1922
created space for Islamists within the anti-
imperialist movement. By the late 1920s,
the Muslim Brotherhood had emerged as a
prominent political actor under British
colonialism with a discourse combining a
desire for independence and the
preservation of the Islamic values.24 In the
first couple of years after the 1952 coup,
the Free Officers collaborated with the
Brotherhood to crush the Communists. 25
However, after the military Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) had
consolidated its authority, it declared the
Brotherhood illegal, arrested and
imprisoned its leading members, and
purged suspected sympathizers from the
military and ruling Free Officers’ corp.26
Before the Free Officers, during the rule of
King Farouk I, the Islamist movement had
also been suppressed and the movement’s
founding leader Hassan al-Banna was
23 Güney, A. (2002), p. 162.
24 Cleveland, W.L., and Bunton, M. P. (2009). p.
302.
25 Alexander, A., (2011). p. 538.
26 Clevelandand Bunton. (2009). p. 306.
murdered in 1949. But the Brotherhood’s
appeal to Egypt’s poor masses kept the
Islamist movement intact, making it the
chief rival of Nasser’s post-coup
establishment in the 1950s.
Since Islamists had been deeply
involved in Egypt’s independence struggle
and the Brotherhood had already
consolidated a network in Egyptian society
since the late 1920s, Nasserites had to
develop a different strategy towards
political Islam than the one adopted by the
Turkish state elite. The Egyptian state elite
tried to utilize Islam to legitimize their
regime by bringing Islamic institutions,
including Al-Azhar University, under state
control and reorganizing them. 27
Meanwhile, the state turned a blind eye to
the Brotherhood’s existence as long as the
movement refrained from being vocal and
allowed the regime to capitalize on Islamic
values. From the mid-1950s to the 1980s,
candidates from the movement even won
parliamentary seats by standing for various
Egyptian political parties. In the 1970s,
Anwar Sadat’s domestic and international
political opening (al-infitah) further
expanded the permissive space for the
Muslim Brotherhood. In time, the
movement’s discourse moderated and its
leadership adopted a more collaborative
27Ibid., p. 321.
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stance towards the regime.28 At the same
time, however, Egypt’s Islamist movement
was also marred by internal strife, with
radical groups gradually recruiting new
members from the lowest strata of society.
This increased the appeal of the moderate
and accommodating Muslim Brotherhood
to the state elite. Subsequently, Hosni
Mubarak continued the previous policy of
complacency towards the Brotherhood, by
turning a blind eye to its activities without
allowing them to become a legitimate
actor. In the 2000 elections, for example,
candidates from the movement standing as
independents were allowed to run, winning
as many seats as the legal opposition. 29
However, a rise in the Brotherhood’s share
of parliamentary seats to one fifth of the
assembly in the 2005 elections revived the
regime’s threat perception and the
movement suffered unprecedented
suppression from 2005 to 2010.30 Overall,
unlike Turkey’s Kemalist establishment,
the Egyptian state elite have refrained from
staunch secularism, prioritizing loyalty of
the security forces to the state elite over
attempts to secularize society.
Nevertheless, when they considered it
necessary, both state elites have crushed
political Islam and prevented genuine
electoral competition through various
28 Farag, M., (2012). p. 216.
29 Thabet, H. G. (2006). p.18.
30 Farag, M. (2012). p. 216.
methods to block Islamists from taking
political power.
The revolution led by Gaddafi in 1969
which overthrew Libya’s monarchy,
followed an institutional and ideological
path similar to that of the Egyptian
officers. Like them, Gaddafi did not initiate
secular reforms, trying instead to integrate
Islamist discourse within his rule. For
example, his manifesto, the Green Book,
was an eclectic project incorporating Arab
nationalism, Islam and economic
egalitarianism. In its early phase, the new
Libyan establishment tried to depoliticize
Islamists and restrict the political power of
the ulema by integrating a certain version
of Islamism with Arab nationalism. One
reason for this explicit integration of
Islamism into state-building might be that,
unlike Egypt and Turkey, Libya had lacked
intensive exposure to the West until the
20th century and so Westernizers never
formed a significant faction within the
revolutionaries’ group who later formed
the state elite. Moreover, Ottoman support
to the resistance movement against the
Italian invasion in 1910 limited rejection of
the Ottoman past compared to Egypt, while
at the same time the appeal of pan-
Islamism persisted. 31 Indeed, Gaddafi’s
policies evolved into a form of pan-
Islamism in the late 1970s, with Libya
31 Anderson, L. (1986). p. 66.
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financing Islamist militia in several
African countries.32 However, this resulted
in Libya’s gradual international isolation
by other African states and, more
importantly, by the US in the 1980s.
What makes the Libyan case distinct
from both the Turkish and Egyptian state-
society relations is the extent to which
Gaddafi went to redefine Islam. The
Turkish state elite was more interested in
the political institutionalization of the
Islamists and limiting religion to the
private sphere, while the Egyptian
establishment was concerned primarily
with limiting the political power of the
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist
groups, as well as the religious scholars. In
contrast, in Libya, under a more
personalized form of rule than in Egypt,
Gaddafi went as far as reinterpreting
Koranic script. Initial collaboration
between Libyan religious leaders and
Qaddafi against the king soon turned into a
struggle for power. In Libya where Colonel
Gaddafi kept a tighter control over all
forms of political movements and activities
than in Egypt, the Islamist Movement
encountered serious obstacles and as a
result it did not develop into a moderate
movement as it had done in Egypt and
Turkey. 33 As a result, Libya’s Islamist
32 St John, R. B. (2008). p. 95.
33 Inclusion in the electoral process is assumed to
have a moderating effect on the radical movements
movement did not become more moderate,
unlike what happened in Egypt and
Turkey. Instead, militant Islamists
resorting to political violence found wider
appeal in Libyan society from the mid-
1980s onwards, 34 with clashes between
state security forces and radical Islamists
intensifying into a civil war in the mid-
1990s. 35 In contrast to Egypt and other
countries in the Middle East, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Libya has been
overshadowed by the strength of more
radical groups.
Tunisia’s state elite has been relatively
more secular and civilian than both the
Egyptian and Libyan elites. Habib
Bourguiba, the leader of the independence
movement, was influenced by French
socialism and shaped his party
accordingly. 36 The Neo Destour Party,
later renamed as the Destourian Socialist
Party, established by defectors from the
conservative Destour Party, also
emphasized secularism and nationalism.37
However, Bourguiba established a one-
in general. In Libya, the state elite did not allow
even a fraudulent electoral process as they did not
need the consent of the masses to rule. The oil
economy was enough to keep the regime alive.
Hence, the Islamists remained quite radical
compared to those in Egypt and Tunisia where there
was some kind of electoral competition and
openings for the Islamists to run as independent
candidates or on the lists of the other parties.
34 Takeyh, R., (1998). p. 168.
35 Ronen, Y.( 2002). p. 7.
36 Halliday, F. (1990). p. 25.
37 Angrist, M P., (1999). p. 749.
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party state, which led to both the secular
and Islamist opposition accusing the state
elite of corruption and authoritarian
policies, especially from the 1970s
onwards. In response, the Tunisian state
first tried to utilize rising Islamism against
the left by tolerating the former to a certain
extent. Later, however, the gradual growth
of the Islamic Tendency Movement
(referred as MTI from its original French
name) unsettled Tunisia’s rulers38 and the
Bourguiba administration arrested and
imprisoned MTI’s activists, and declared it
illegal. Thus, the Tunisian case resembles
more the Turkish one than the Egyptian
and Libyan cases with regard to state-
society relations. Both the Turkish and
Tunisian state elites have pursued
secularist policies so opposition to these
policies has been anti-secular and anti-state
in both countries. 39 However, a contrast
tothe Turkish case, the Tunisian military
have not extensively intervened in politics
although, as an authoritarian leader,
Bourguiba did not refrain from resorting to
use force to suppress labour strikes and
uprisings in the early 1980s, despite his
civilian background. In doing so, however,
he carefully used a special division named
the Brigade of Public Order, thereby
keeping the rest of the military out of
domestic politics. In Tunisia, therefore, the
38 Waltz, S. (1986). pp. 652-53.
39 Ware, L. B. (1985). p. 28.
military has not become part of the state
elite, and remained uninvolved in the
country’s modernization project.40
While the transfer of power from
Bourguiba to Ben Ali, who was the Prime
Minister, was not achieved democratically,
it was not a clear coup d’état. His fall
started when in its efforts to prosecute the
MTI, the Bourguiba government had
charged the movement and its leader,
Rachid al-Ghannouchi, of terrorist
activities. However, the court freed those
charged and in response, Bourguiba
ordered a retrial of 15 of the key leaders
and demanded that 12 of them be hanged
by the weekend, whereupon Ben Ali drew
on Article 57 of the constitution to secure
medical certification that the president was
physically and mentally unable to rule.41
Initially, Ben Ali’s rise to power allowed a
rapprochement between the moderate
Islamist MTI and the state elite, with Ben
Ali capitalizing more on Islamic values to
revitalize the legitimacy of the regime. In
1989, although the Islamist movement,
then renamed Ennahda, remained illegal, it
was allowed to run with independent
candidates in the first elections under Ben
Ali’s rule. However, he still refused to
legalize Islamist political groups in general
and allow them to compete electorally as a
40 Ibid. p. 37.
41 Ware, LB., (1988). p. 592.
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political party.42 From 1987 until he fled to
Saudi Arabia in 2011, Ben Ali and the state
elite prevented fair political competition;
yet, they also followed Bourguiba’s policy
of keeping the military out of the decision-
making process, probably to prevent any
potential threat to their power.
Recent Transformations in Turkey
and the “Arab Spring”
The 2000s were characterized by very
important international transformations
following the September 11 attacks in
2001, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq in 2003 and towards the end of the
decade, the Arab revolts in the Middle East
and North Africa. Domestically, the key
development in Turkey was the election of
the conservative democrat Justice and
Development Party (JDP) in 2002. On
assuming power, the party’s leader, Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan noted that his party would
show that democracy can co-exist
peacefully in a majority Muslim country
and that Turkey can be considered as an
example for all Muslim countries.43
The rhetoric of ‘moderate Islam’
started to be used first by the then US
Secretary of State Colin Powell, who
labelled Turkey as an Islamic Republic
which can act as a role model for the rest
42 Halliday, F. (1990). p. 27.
43 Kuru A., (2013), p.1.
of the Arab world. 44 This statement was
echoed by the JDP-led government, which
aimed at pursuing a more active foreign
policy in the region. However, Powell’s
statement infuriated the secularist President
of the time, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who
argued that Turkey was not an Islamic
Republic, but rather a secular democratic
one, and thus could not constitute a model
country where moderate Islam was
adopted.45 The fact that such a presidential
statement was felt necessary revealed once
again the ongoing tensions between
Turkey’s state and political elites.
A second important development
during the 2000s was the increasing pace
in Turkey’s accession process to the
European Union (EU) following the
declaration of Turkey as an official
candidate in 1999. A major impetus for
change was the eight harmonization
packages required by the EU to open the
accession negotiations. These were
approved by the Turkish Parliament
between 2002 and 2004 and which mostly
included changes to the 1982 Constitution
– which had been imposed during military
rule from 1980 to 1983. After 2005,
44 “Powell’a göre Türkiye İslam Cumhuriyeti”
found at
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/04/03/dunya/adun.
html (accessed on 6 January 2013).
45 “Sezerin Ilimli Islam Tepkisi” found at
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.asp
x?aType=HaberDetayArsiv&KategoriID=4&Articl
eID=32351&PAGE=1 (accessed on 30 December
2013).
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however, the initially pro-EU orientation of
the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
government changed to decreasing interest
in the EU and a slowdown in the reform
process. 46 During this period, the AKP
mostly focused on reversing legal practices
introduced into Turkish political life after
the military’s 1997 ‘post-modern’ coup.47
In this period, the government acted rather
unilaterally and without establishing a
broad consensus to introduce various legal
changes through Parliament. These
included constitutional changes regarding
the dissolution of political parties, changes
to the structure of the education system,
lifting the headscarf ban on female students
and public servants, and abolishing the
daily national oath in primary schools. 48
46 Patton M. J., (2007) p. 339.
47 The name ‘postmodern coup’ was given to the
clash between the army and the political leadership
on February 28, 1997, in which the military
overthrew the coalition government led by
Necmettin Erbakan of the now-defunct Welfare
Party (RP). The military helped engineer the
removal of the then Islamic-oriented government by
demanding that Erbakan stop or reverse policies
seen as promoting Islam in government affairs. It
increasingly applied overt pressure on Prime
Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the conservative
Islamic Welfare (Refah) Party. At a meeting of the
NSC on 28 February 1997, senior military
commanders issued an 18-point declaration, asking
the government to take measures to curb the
growing Islamist activities. Found at website:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europ
e/tu-military-coup-1997.htm (accessed on 30
December 2013)
48 According to the publication of the resolutions in
the Official Gazette late Oct. 7, public officials will
be permitted to don a headscarf, with the exception
of officials wearing a uniform, while the student
oath, which has been read out loud every morning
for the past 80 years, has been removed. “New
changes legalize headscarves for public officials,
All these policies were interpreted as
AKP’s moving away from its previously
self-proclaimed conservative democrat
character towards authoritarian
tendencies.49
It is noteworthy that in this period there
was also a significant transformation50 in
civil-military relations as the constitutional
powers of the military were eradicated to a
great extent due to the changes carried out
in line with the EU reforms.51 In addition
to the EU’s impact, this civilianization
process was also helped by the Ergenekon
and Balyoz trials over alleged coup
attempts by military cadres during the mid-
2000s, especially after the JDP came to
power. Despite various civilianization
reforms, such as the amendment of the role
and duties of the National Security Council
(NSC), and trials of former generals who
carried out or plotted coup d’états,
problems still prevail regarding civil-
military relations in Turkey. Increasing
civilian control of the military has not
necessarily meant democratic control of it,
since the AKP government has started to
resort to authoritarian measures regarding
discontinue national oath” found at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-changes-
legalize-headscarves-for-public-officials-
discontinue-national-
oath.aspx?PageID=238&NID=55876&NewsCatID
=338 (accessed on 6 January 2014).
49 Çağaptay, S. (2010).
50 Aydınlı, E. (2012). pp. 100-108.
51 Güney A. and Karatekelioğlu P. (2005), pp. 439-
462.
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both the political opposition and civil
society organizations, as evidenced by the
government’s harsh response to recent
protest movements known as the ‘Gezi
Park protests’.52
In the meantime, Turkey is in
search of a new Constitution, which would
replace that of 1982 which was born after
the military coup d’état. This new
Constitution aims to enshrine democratic
freedoms and further distance Turkey from
the era of military coups. However, this
reform suffered a setback in late 2013,
after two and a half years of cross-party
meetings.53 The cross-party panel had tried
to reconcile differences on some of the
most deeply divisive issues in modern
Turkey, ranging from the definition of
Turkish citizenship to the protection of
religious freedoms.
Larbi Sadiki argues that Turkey
needs a robust democratic constitution and
only then can one talk about a regional
democratization model. He considers
today’s Turkey as a synthesis of Kemalist-
thesis and Erdoğan-anti-thesis. 54 If this
constitutional search were to succeed in
52
http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-
analyst-articles/item/49-erdo%C4%9Fan-the-akp-
and-the-repercussions-of-the-gezi-park-
protests.html (accessed on 6 January 2014).
53 Solaker, G. (2013).
54 Sadiki, L. (2013).
,
achieving a consensus between the
Kemalist-secularist and religiously-
oriented elites, it would represent Turkey’s
first truly civilian constitution since all
previous constitutions have been drafted
under military tutelage. However, it needs
to be stressed that civilianization is a
necessary but not a sufficient precondition
for democratic consolidation to take place.
In this respect, not only the constitution,
but the democratic character of the
constitution-making process is extremely
important for democratic consolidation to
take place in Turkey.
With respect to the Middle East,
one can argue that the transformation of
international politics in the 2000s,
especially US foreign policy towards the
region, came as a shock to MENA
countries struggling with economic
difficulties and political discontent
expressed by various Islamist groups.
Conventional American foreign policy in
the Middle East has been built on balance
of power struggles between Russia (earlier
as the Soviet Union) and the US, and the
rise of political Islam did not constitute a
major foreign policy issue as long as it did
not target US citizens and diplomatic
representation in the region. However, the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, altered
US foreign policy dramatically, with the
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American administration accusing Al-
Qaeda of the attacks and declaring a ‘war
on terror’, which made radical Islamist
organizations around the world targets of
the American state. The US soon declared
war on two countries: Afghanistan, as the
country where Al-Qeada emerged and had
its headquarters; and Iraq, as the country
allegedly harbouring and aiding the
terrorists. Many countries were invited to
contribute to and collaborate in this war on
terror.55 In this context, MENA countries
had few options except to declare radical
Islamists illegal. Egypt, a long-term ally of
the United States since the 1990 Gulf War
on Iraq and a recipient of American aid
since the Camp David Accords negotiated
by Mannheim Begin and Anwar Sadat
really had no choice. Tunisia had usually
followed a non-aggression policy in the
region with a number of attempts at
mediation. However, the Ben Ali
administration became a partner of the US
in the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism
Initiative, which aimed at preventing and
eliminating terrorism in Africa. 56 As for
Libya, Gaddafi was isolated after the 1988
Lockerbie bombing and support for radical
Islamists in Africa had led to the
intensification of international sanctions
since the late 1990s. However, in the post-
September 11 international environment,
55 Walt, S. M. (2001). p. 57.
56 Archer, T and Popovic, T. (2007).
Libya also had to declare war on terror to
avoid American aggression.57
In between 2000 to 2011, each of
these three countries suffered from similar
problems, including economic difficulties
and high unemployment, especially among
the youth, allegations of corruption, social
discontent with authoritarian policies,
denial of free electoral competition and
challenges from political Islam. In Egypt
and Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood
branches had long become the major
organization for Islamists and their
candidates were allowed to run as
independents, although the elections
continued to be rigged in both countries. In
Libya, not even a fraudulent electoral
process existed, leading to more radical
Islamist groups coming into violent
conflict with the state’s security forces.
However, it was the self-
immolation of a street vendor in protest
against police brutality that ignited the
events later to be called the Arab revolts,
and popularly known as the Arab Spring,
in late December 2010. Within a few
months, Ben Ali fled from Tunisia, while
events spread to other MENA countries.
Hosni Mubarak was ousted from power in
February 2011 and Gaddafi was captured
and killed in October 2011.
57 St John, R. B. (2008). p. 103.
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The main reason behind the rapid
dissolution of Ben Ali’s power in Tunisia
has been identified as the military’s refusal
to shoot at protesters.58 In 2001, in the first
elections of the post Ben Ali period, the
Muslim Brotherhood’s party, Ennahda,
came first under the leadership of
Mohamed Ghannouchi who had returned
from exile.59 The Islamists’ victory and the
rise of the more radical Salafis raised
concerns about the future of the secular
characteristics of the Tunisian state,60 with
relations between the Islamist government
and the secular opposition remaining tense,
although the conflict remained within
civilian politics. Most recently, in October
2013 after two secular opposition leaders
were killed, Tunisia’s government stepped
aside in favor of a caretaker government
before holding elections in 2014.61
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood
formed a party called the Freedom and
Justice Party, winning a landslide victory
at the head of a coalition of conservative,
moderate Islamist parties. The more radical
Islamist organization in Egypt, the Salafis,
who had for long considered politics as
haram, abandoned their traditional policy
58 Anderson, L. ( 2011). p. 3.
59 All information about the elections in this paper
are retrieved from IFES Election Guide at
http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2217/.
60 Zeghal, M. (2013). p. 262.
61 “Tunisia | Reuters.com.”
http://www.reuters.com/places/tunisia (December
27, 2013)
of avoiding electoral politics, and
established a political party, the Party of
Light. The Salafist party established an
election alliance named as the Islamic Bloc
and they came second in the elections. The
policies of the governing party’s leader,
Mohammed Morsi, soon confirmed the
worries of liberals that the Muslim
Brotherhood would not tolerate secular
opposition and would put Islamic law in
effect. However, in July 2013, the Supreme
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), which
had been established following the
overthrow of Mubarak, staged a putsch. As
of December 2013, violent clashes between
Morsi’s supporters and the military-backed
interim government continued while the
Muslim Brotherhood has been declared a
terrorist group and banned from political
activity once more. 62 Former Defense
Minister and member of the SCAF Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi was elected president in May
2014. El-Sisi got more votes than Morsi
did in 2011 and his election marked the
beginning of a new period under military
influence and the sealing of the Muslim
Brotherhood off from governance.
It is possible to argue that the
revolts of the Arab Spring failed most
badly in Libya. After Gaddafi was killed, a
62 “Egypt Declares Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist
Group | World News | Theguardian.com.”
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/25/eg
ypt-declares-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-group
(December 27, 2013).
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militarist National Transition Council was
established. The Muslim Brotherhood
established the Justice and Construction
Party, but a bloc of moderate Islamists and
liberals came first in the 2012 election and
established an interim government to draft
a new constitution. However, political
violence has almost turned into civil war
since then.63
In general, transitions in the period
following these Arab revolts have been
painful, and each state still remains far
from establishing a functioning democratic
system. Political Islam went through a
remarkable transformation in this process,
with both radical and moderate movements
forming political parties and competing in
elections. The electoral process has been
promising in this respect if we assume its
moderating influence will continue.
However, the secular-Islamist cleavage has
nonetheless persisted. The Islamists’
electoral successes, especially those of the
Muslim Brotherhood, worry the secular
and liberal opposition. This tension
manifests itself most clearly in the
constitution-making process regarding the
role of Islamic law and the rights of
women.
63 “Egypt Declares Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist
Group | World News | Theguardian.com.”
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/25/eg
ypt-declares-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-group
(December 27, 2013).
When the Tunisian National
Constituent Assembly was drafting a new
constitution in December 2012, the leading
party, Ennahda, wanted to build the
constitution on the basis of Sharia. 64
However, the final draft was not based on
Sharia, although in the Preamble and
Article 1, Islam is declared as the state’s
religion, while Article 73 states that the
President must be a Muslim. 65 Sharia is
only mentioned explicitly in Article 114 as
the basis of financial law. Article 45
provides for gender equality and condemns
violence against women. The military’s
exclusion from the political sphere is
provided for by Article 17, which
emphasizes that it has to be politically
impartial and subordinate to the civilian
authorities. Thus, in both state-society and
civil-military relations, the draft Tunisian
constitution sets a unique example for the
MENA region.
In Egypt, by contrast, the
constitutional process has been rather
problematic. After ousting Mubarak, the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) became an important political
actor, even after the election of
Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim
64 Sadek, G. (2013).
65 “Unofficial English Translation of the Fourth
Draft of the Tunisian Constitution | ConstitutionNet
- Supporting Constitution Builders Globally.”
http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/unofficial-
english-translation-fourth-draft-tunisian-
constitution (December 27, 2013).
22
Brotherhood as President. The overthrow
of the Morsi government in a coup d’état in
July 2013 was therefore not surprising as is
the influence of the military on drafting a
new constitution. SCAF has been
influential in the constitution-making
process, especially with respect to elections
and criminal law. Since Mubarak’s arrest,
the military establishment remained active
and exercised its power during the writing
of the constitution. It held power over and
monitored the functioning of the
constituent assembly, which led to the draft
constitution in 2012. The President and
SCAF struggled over the draft constitution
on the issue of the distribution of powers.
The post-Arab Spring constitution of Egypt
was finally approved by the President on
December 26, 2012, thus replacing the
2011 Provisional Constitution of SCAF.66
Regarding, the constitution’s religious
content, Article 1 defines the Egyptian
people as part of the umma. Article 2 states
Islam as the religion of the state and
subjects legislation to Sharia. Article 4
establishes Al-Azhar as the main source of
Islamic knowledge. Article 219 further
stipulates that Sunni Islamic principles
form the basis of the law. The draft
66 The analysis of the Egyptian Constitution in this
article relies on its English translation by Nivien
Saleh at http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-
2012-translation/ (accessed on May 6, 2013). The
interim government established after the coup on
July 3, declared that the constitution will be put to a
referendum in 2014.
constitution lacks any clear reference to
gender equality; clauses regarding women
were inserted within those on family and
social policy instead, thus reinforcing
traditional gender roles (Article 10). The
strength of the military establishment is
also integrated into the constitution.
According to Article 236, ‘All
constitutional declarations that the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and
the President of the Republic issued
between 11 February 2011 and the entry
into effect of the Constitution are hereby
repealed. But their effects on the past
remain in existence.’ This article may be
interpreted as a guarantee that the initial
enactments of the SCAF are not
challenged. According to Article 147, the
president also appoints military public
servants, thereby subordinating the military
to the president. However, Article 195
states that the Minister of Defense will be
appointed from among the members of the
military, and there is also an autonomous
military judiciary (Article 198). Although
the draft was completed during Morsi’s
time in office, the Muslim Brotherhood
claims that the final draft has been altered
by the post-coup government.67
Of the three Arab countries
discussed here, the constitution-making
67 “Brotherhood Rejects Egypt Charter.” 2013.
BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-25183139 (December 27, 2013).
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process is slowest in Libya. Libya’s lack of
any electoral history and the absence of
any basic political party organization
certainly accounts for this situation. In
Egypt and Tunisia, there is at least the
minimal institutional structure required for
the dialogue necessary for drafting a
constitution. Libya’s ongoing civil strife
also prevents the functioning of the
constitutional committee. So far, therefore,
the only achievement has been the
approval of the Constitutional Drafting
Commission electoral law, by which the 60
members of the constitution-making
committee are elected so that all tribes and
regions are represented. In contrast to
Tunisia, it is highly likely that Sharia will
be the basis of the new constitution given
the lack of a strong secular opposition.
However, as of August 2014, there is not
much progress in constitution-making due
to the deep political divisions.
As this discussion of the draft
constitutions reveals, the new states and
their governments have not yet been able
to settle issues regarding the secular-
Islamist cleavage and civil-military
relations. Of the three countries, Tunisia
appears to have the most liberal draft
constitution because Islamic law does not
form the basis of legislation although it is
declared the state religion.
Notwithstanding, the military’s decision
not to use force against anti-government
demonstrations, which allowed Tunisia’s
former state elite to be overthrown, the
military establishment has been kept out of
the constitution-making process and
carefully subordinated to civilian control in
the constitution. However, the secular
opposition is still suspicious of the
incumbent government’s intentions to put
the Islamic law in effect if it expands its
power base in the upcoming elections. In
the Egyptian constitution, Sharia is used as
the basis of legislation, with the
institutional authority of Al-Azhar scholars
being explicitly recognized. The
constitution also empowers the military.
Given that the democratically elected
Islamist government was toppled by the
military, prospects for a functioning
civilian political system are not promising
in the near future. However, Libya’s
situation is the grimmest, with even basic
institutions not functioning, tribal social
structures persisting, and the armed forces
divided while the country has collapsed
into civil war.
Concluding Remarks: Turkey as a
Model?
As this paper’s comparative
analysis reveals, it is hard to conclude that
Turkey can constitute a model for MENA
countries. From the three periods analyzed,
the founding of the modern states, and the
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pre and post Arab Spring periods, it is clear
that the Turkish experience with
democracy is unique due to its specific
historical background and the political
culture of Turkish society. Its state-
building process has followed a specific
trajectory, marked by a high degree of
Westernization and modernization.
Although there had been military
interventions in Turkish political history,
the strong adherence to the Kemalist
principles prevented the military from
staying in power for long periods.
Eventually, Turkey’s accession process to
the European Union has proved to be a
major factor in bringing about the
transformation of the military’s traditional
role in Turkish politics, which rendered
future coup d’états almost impossible.
Turkey’s democracy, however, still
needs to be further consolidated. In this
respect, the relationship between the state
elites and political elites are of utmost
importance. The state elite who perceived
themselves as the guardians of the
Republican principles saw the
politicization of Islam as a major threat and
want the state to control the practice and
public visibility of religion. The political
elites argue that secularism, imposed from
above, was not embraced by the masses
and attempt to take measures that will
make public life more suitable for
practicing Muslims. The mutual suspicion
and contempt have driven both sides to
resort to non-democratic methods. Being
part of the state elite, the military is
mobilized against the political elites. The
political elites did not take the worries of
the secular opposition into consideration in
decision and policy-making; and, as the
recent developments reveal, they fabricated
law cases without solid evidence to
undermine the credibility of the prominent
members of the bureaucratic and military
establishment. In other words, democracy
has not been the only game in the town.
However, it is possible to be optimistic
for the future. The legal reforms have
curbed the political powers of the military
and awareness of the negative
repercussions of military interventions
seems to have developed in the last few
years. The Gezi protests, on the other hand,
reveal that Turkish society, despite being
conservative on average, despises
authoritarianism and intervention in the
life-styles of the people. In future, the state
elites are more likely to refrain from
relying on the extra-parliamentary actors
and the political elites have to recognize
the civilian secular opposition.
However, at its current stage, the
Turkish political system does not resolve
its problems with respect to the state-
society relations, and its flaws prevent the
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country from being a model for any other
country. Besides, the state elites and the
political elites mean two different things
when they talk about the Turkish model,
and both are problematic: the former
suffers from elitism and militarism, while
the latter tends to be authoritarian on the
inside and expansionist/revisionist on the
outside.
No matter how it is formulated, the
Turkish model appears unacceptable to
Middle Eastern public opinion, which can
be explained as resulting from lingering
resentment of Turkey’s Ottoman past.
Research indicates that the level of positive
support to Turkey playing a greater role in
the region has consistently declined in the
last three years. 68 As the Neo-Ottoman’s
discourse of the JDP period indicates,
relations between Turkey and Arab
countries are shaped by history on both
sides. On the one hand, Turkey’s ruling
party the AKM apparently views Turkey as
a regional leader with historical experience
of ruling the MENA region. On the other
hand, Arab leaders and public opinion
resent the Turkish model for similar
historical reasons, and from an entirely
opposite perspective. Turkey’s
interventions in the internal conflicts of the
68 Akgün, M. and Şenyücel Gündoğar, S. 2013.
Ortadoğu’da Türkiye Algısı 2013. TESEV, p. 21.
http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/031
22013120651.pdf (December 12, 2013).
countries in the region are identified as one
of the main reasons why Turkey cannot be
a model for the region.69 In other words,
Turkey’s activism in the region appears to
be perceived as a patronizing act.
Constitution-making processes in the
aftermath of the revolts also reveal that the
history of state-society relations and civil-
military relations conditioned Egypt,
Tunisia and Libya in a different way than
Turkey. Despite the tension between the
secularists and Islamists in Turkey, the
level of secularization at the social and
constitutional level is incomparable to
these countries. As far as the civil-military
relations are concerned, the legal reforms
in Turkey have so far strengthened the
autonomy of the civilians from the
military. The military remains a very
strong political actor in both Egypt and
Libya and is empowered by constitutional
rights. Tunisian politics and the new
constitution have been more civilian than
the Turkish one, yet not more secular.
Overall, it can be concluded that the
Turkish model does not seem to appeal to
the bureaucrats and politicians in these
countries.
69 Ibid.
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